Just a few months prior, Obama was caught on a hot mic, expressing to then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he would have more “flexibility” after the election to work out their differences. Medvedev agreed to “transmit this information to Vladimir [Putin],” who was shortly returning to office.
Obama launched his political career and was propelled to the Oval Office as an anti-war pragmatist. He was attacked for being too willing to talk to American adversaries. Yet somewhere along the way, he fell in line with the neocon perspective.
Regime change in Ukraine
It was in Obama’s second term that the U.S. intervened in the Maidan revolution in Ukraine. Violent protesters drove out the legitimately elected President Yanukovych, who supported an association agreement with Russia over one with the EU.
Within weeks of Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia annexed Crimea and set in motion the complex chain of events and series of diplomatic failures that eventually led to the eruption of war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022.
Neoconservatives became famous as the architects of wars in the Middle East after 9/11, but the neoconservative agenda really developed as a strategy to address former Soviet territories like Ukraine in the late 1990s. Highlighting the bipartisan nature of the movement, a major contributor was Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (who happens to be the father of Mika of Morning Joe fame).
Brzezinski wrote an influential book in 1997 called The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. The main message of the book was that the Eurasian area (Russia, Ukraine and nearby countries) was of the utmost strategic importance. American foreign policy, he argued, should be focused on preventing any other nation from consolidating power in that region.
American meddling in Ukraine over the past few decades starts to make a lot more sense in the context of a foreign policy establishment that perceived control over the Eurasian landmass as vital to preserving American geopolitical dominance.
What went wrong?
The intentions of the neoconservative movement were arguably admirable, at least from the American vantage point. And their strategic insights were not entirely irrational.
There is no question, for example, that Eurasia is strategically important. There is even a certain appeal to the idea of exporting liberal democracy to a region like the Middle East that is characterized by ancient (and some might say oppressive) tribal power structures. Many if not most Republicans bought into this idea some 20 years ago.
The problem, which is the same problem that has afflicted great powers over the course of world history, is that the U.S. overextended itself in its desire to expand and solidify its position of global dominance.
There is room for debate on this subject, but the adventures of the Bush-Cheney administration to reshape the Middle East are widely considered a failure. Afghanistan belongs to the Taliban. Iran is now terrorizing Israel and the entire region and making rapid progress towards a nuclear weapon.
As Trump has consistently pointed out, the U.S. spent trillions on Middle Eastern wars, lost thousands of American lives, killed hundreds of thousand of civilians, and now has little to show for it.
American efforts to peel Ukraine away from Russia have also arguably backfired in a major way. One of the arguments presented to the American people was that supporting the Ukraine war effort would wear down and degrade the Russian military. As a result of heavy military spending and sanctions, the war would perhaps even break the Russian economy.
Some neocons even felt the Russian invasion would lead to the end of Putin’s control over his government. In response to enormous casualties and widespread economic deprivation, the Russian people would rise up and remove Putin from the Kremlin. (Why it would even be in American interests to foment a possible revolution within the world’s largest nuclear power—and potentially cause its disintegration—is a separate question.)
The reality, however, is that the Russian economy is now possibly stronger than it was before the war. Its military is battle-hardened. Its industrial capacity is reinvigorated. Putin appears to enjoy a high degree of popular support. Notwithstanding U.S. attempts to isolate Russia financially, Russia appears to have developed robust workarounds to the U.S. sanctions regime.
No one likes a bully
It has been widely speculated that the US and its allies had the opportunity to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine diplomatically in early 2022 but actually preferred to let the war unfold, based on the theory that it would ultimately weaken Russia. To the extent this was a deliberate strategic decision by the Biden administration, one of the most counterproductive outcomes is how it clearly strengthened the BRICS alliance, which now includes many nations beyond the founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
In June 2023, Secretary of State Blinken claimed in Helsinki that “Russia is more isolated on the world stage than ever.” Yet Russia appears to be thriving as the ringleader of the BRICS, an economic and political association that is becoming increasingly relevant.
With Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov seemingly functioning as the diplomatic mastermind, the BRICS are coming together in response to the U.S.-led sanctions regime against Russia and the weaponization of the global financial system.
Among the highest priorities of the BRICS now is to develop international payment systems that bypass American financial institutions. Systematic growth in the gold reserves of BRICS central banks in recent years is likely connected to this project, which could lead to the creation of a gold-backed BRICS currency.
With respect to Ukraine, the neoconservatives miscalculated the extent to which Russia would push back on what it has for decades perceived as a serious existential threat to its own security. By bringing Ukraine into its orbit, formally or informally, NATO put Russia in a highly vulnerable position. Moscow sits only 500 flat miles from the Ukraine border.
Supporters of the war in Ukraine also miscalculated the willingness and capacity of other countries around the world, especially China, to lend support to Russia.
The neoconservative playbook was written at a time when the U.S. did not have any serious challengers. Since Brzezinksi first published The Grand Chessboard in 1997, real GDP in China has more than quadrupled. The Chinese economy is still smaller than the U.S. economy at market exchange rates but has surpassed the U.S. economy on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, which adjusts for relative costs.